Esteemed Professor Emerita Anna Cienciała died on Christmas Eve.
A specialist on Polish Interwar Diplomacy and author of numerous articles and books, both in English and Polish, she will nonetheless be remembered for her co-editing of Soviet documents, which were published by Yale University as Katyn A Crime Unpunished.
Professor Cienciała's introduction to each section, actually creating a monograph on the subject of Polish history, with a detailed description of the immediate post-WWI and pre-WWII period, serves as the best available succinct description of Polish history for the English reader.
Enclosed is information about Memorial Services - updates will be posted to my webpage (see below).
Professor Anna Cienciała
Profesor Emerita, University of Kansas
Nagrodzona Krzyżem Komandorskim z Gwiazdą Orderu
Msza Święta za Jej Duszę zostanie odprawiona w
dniu, 18 stycznia 2015 o godzinie 12:00
w Kościele Św. Stanisława, BiM na 7 ulicy w Manhattanie
Uroczystości Żałobne na University of Kansas –
w dniu 22 stycznia 2015 (szczegóły do ustalenia)
Msza Świeta w Warszawie – przed 16 stycznia 2015
(szczegóły do ustalenia)
proszę śledzić researchingkatyn.blogspot.com
Emerita, University of Kansas
Recipient - Commander's Cross with Star of the Order Zaslugi
will be offered on
on January 18, 2015 at 12:00PM
St. Stanislaus, B.M. Church on 7th Street in Manhattan
Service at the University of Kansas – Lawrence
22, 2015 (details to follow)
in Warsaw – prior to January 16, 2015 (details to follow)
Please check researchingkatyn.blogspot.com for further updates
Many thanks to the Center for Russian and East European Studies
at Kansas University which used Title VI Funds as well as the generosity of the
Backus Family, which helps sponsor a series of lectures at the Center, for
inviting me to present on October 27 and 28.Special thanks to Bart Redford, Assistant Director of CREES and to
Professor Anna Cienciala for selecting me, helping me get there and making sure
I was where I should be when I should be.
can appreciate an additional article about Reverend Stanislaus Orlemanski,
as he has been a seriously understudied individual, and certainly the
transcript of the Soviet report is interesting, I find it necessary to correct
several misconceptions that have been presented by Mr. Markiewicz in his recent
I will attempt to present my remarks by following the layout of the article,
with one exception.
every article that has appeared, Oskar Lange is presented as the intellectual,
the professor, the economist, while Reverend Orlemanski is a quasi-country
bumpkin, and Mr. Markiewicz falls into this same trap.This was not the case.
On Page 61,
Mr. Markiewicz refers solely to the possible plans for including Oskar Langein the post-war Polish government, although
later he does make passing reference to both Oskar Lange and Stanislaus
Orlemanski. This then is the crux of the issue, as it was not solely Lange who
was expected to take a role in the post-war government, and the trip to Moscow
was predicated on Orlemanski joining him in that plan, which is documented in
correspondence sent to the Papal Nuncio in Washington, confirming the
expectation concerning Reverend Orlemanski.
On Page 56, there is presented a photograph of Stanislaus
Orlemanski and it is described as follows: Reverend Stanisław Orlemański, founder of the pro-Soviet Kościuszko League, upon his graduation from
Orchard Lake Seminary in 1910.Yet,
in 1910, Stanislaus Orlemanski was not ordained, nor did he ever complete theological
and formation studies at Orchard Lake Seminary (more properly St. Cyril and
Methodius Seminary). School records state that he solely graduated from St.
Mary’s and further research confirms that he was ordained outside of the United
States in late 1915. Thus at the time the photograph was taken he was not a
Reverend, nor does the material held at the Polish Museum description state that,
as it refers to an occurrence – a reunion in 1918, when he was indeed, an
ordained priest and thus the image should clearly have omitted the use of
However, these issues appear to be
insignificant when one notes the repeat of a standard presentation of
Stanislaus Orlemanski as solely a
pro-Soviet sympathizer, and a simple parish priest.
I would posit that Stanislaus Orlemanski was
a much more complicated and multi-faceted individual, one that we may or may
not agree with, but more complex than generally presented. The fact is that the
Reverend Orlemanski had written a series of articles for, and been published by
the conservative PRCUA in the mid-1920’s.Thus his description as a leftist or pro-Soviet sympathizer requires
layering and consideration, and not a blanket statement.Certainly, at the least summary description
of this alternate dimension is warranted. Certainly, the statement by John Olejniczak
of the PRCUA, quoted on p. 59, that he “does not represent anyone at all” requires
a deeper explanation, given the fact that no less than six lengthy articles had
earlier been published by the self-same PRCUA.
In describing the April 1944 trip, the author
makes it appear as though Lange and Orlemanski travelled to Moscow jointly, yet
nothing could be farther from the truth.Clearly, their journey began together, or rather was planned to be a
joint trip.Yet Reverend Orlemanski so
disliked Oscar Lange that he had three conditions for his trip; one of which was
that he refused to travel together with him. The commander of the airfield in
Great Falls, from which both men started their trip, precisely noted that Oskar
Lange flew out on April 11th, and then noted that it was that
Reverend Orlemanski appeared in his office on April 18th.
In contradiction to the statement that: During
their trip, the two men reported on the state of soldiers in the Polish army
forming in the USSR and visited children’s homes and schools. The two men met
personally with Soviet dictator Josef Stalin and Foreign Minister Vyacheslav
Molotov. (p. 57) – which leads one to believe that their meetings were
joint, and that the trips to the field were joint, leads one to an incorrect
assumption - it was not so.The meetings,
as appears in eyewitness records, were separate and individual.In fact, the very document that is cited by
Mr. Markiewicz refers only to Reverend Orlemanski being present at the specific
meeting that is reported on.
Once again, it should be noted that
Orlemanski, just as he travelled alone outbound, returned separately from
Moscow, while Lange remained there until early June.
Stanislaus Orlemanski had returned from
Moscow, landing in Seattle, on May 11, 1944 – clearly, the meetings that Oskar
Lange held with the Soviet authorities and the pro-Soviet Polish government required
a lengthier presence, while Rev. Orlemanski may have wanted to return home for
Ascension Thursday, which was May 18, 1944.Thus it is impossible for them to have made joint statements upon their
return, as appears to be indicated from the sentence structure in Mr.
Markiewicz’s article “Upon their arrival back to the United States, Lange and
Orlemański (sic) spoke very favorably of their visit, praising and lauding….”
However, it is the following, un-footnoted
sentence in Mr. Markiewicz’s article that is most troubling “President
Roosevelt even invited Reverend Orlemański (sic) to the White House to describe
his travels.Speaking with the American
leader for over two hours…” It is troubling, because heretofore all records
indicate that no such meeting occurred, and that Secretary of State Cordell
Hull argued against the proposal of such a meeting.Additionally, since Reverend Orlemanski was
clerically suspended and did not venture outside his rectory, his only contact
with the US government occurred during an interview with a retired US Dept. of
State Consular Official who travelled to Springfield, Massachusetts to
interview him at the rectory of his parish, Our Lady of the Rosary Church.Had Reverend Orlemanski travelled to meet
with the President the press would have noted it – and the press was certainly
noting the fact that he was not offering Mass at his church, or when he did
offer Mass they noted that he had not given a sermon.
Clearly, if Mr. Markiewicz has located any
documentation that shows that the Reverend did travel to meet the President,
information, which is heretofore unknown, a reference note would be
Reverend Orlemanski met with various
individuals in Moscow, both journalists and other Westerners, many of whom left
journals and aide-de-memoires of this period.None of them noted Lange’s presence while they were with
Orlemanski.Further, all the photographs
published of the Stalin, Molotov and Orlemanski meetings (yes, there were two
and not one) only show the three men together, with Orlemanski looming head and
shoulders over the other two. There is
no photograph that has surfaced showing all four together, had there been a joint
meeting of the four, it is highly probable that would have been such a photo.The animosity of Reverend Orlemanski for
Oskar Lange was so great that even Stalin respected it.
What Mr. Markiewicz fails to note in his
article, is that the entire trip took place with the knowledge and aid of the
United States government, and as Major Jordan noted, the Reverend carried “military passes for the
Alaska Defense Force and Western Defense Command... a passport from the State
Department empowering him to travel to the Soviet Union by way of Egypt, Iraq
and Iran. He also had visas for the three countries.”No one could have received those other visas,
or orders to fly on US Air Force equipment without government permission.This aid significantly exceeded the
well-known correspondence between Stalin and FDR on the subject of passports
for the two travelers.
It is relevant to note that it was the Soviet
News Agency (TASS) that betrayed Stalin’s (implied) promise that the Lange and
Orlemanski trip would be kept secret, yet it was primarily Orlemanski’s
presence which was immediately broadcast, forcing Roosevelt to explain the
situation, although only discussing Orlemanski – it was as though Lange did not
As for the Soviet report on the meeting which
Mr. Markiewicz presents – it is clearly either a compilation of the two
meetings which occurred or a summary of them (which appears implausible since
Professor Miner quotes a report on the earlier meeting in his book), and which are described
not only in several aide de memoire’s, but also in State Dept. reports – and that
it was only after the first meeting, when Rev. Orlemanski reported that Stalin
had promised the moon and the stars (my terminology) that one of the Moscow
Westerners asked why he did not have anything in writing.The ‘promissory note’ which is frequently
referred to appeared as a result of that second meeting.To reiterate – the document that Mr.
Markiewicz presents in his article clearly refers to this being a second
meeting (vide P. 64) “He [Orlemański
(sic)] said last time that something needs to be done in order to split
the Polish Catholics in America.” (Emphasis mine – K.P.)
It is therefore misleading for the general
reader or university undergraduate to be told that
presents two previously unknown Soviet archival documents. The first deals with
the visit of Fr. Stanislaw Orlemanski, a pro-Soviet Polish-American Catholic
priest to Moscow and his meeting with Stalin.
As the first two sentences of this
article read.These sentences lead one
to believe that nothing from the Soviet archives has ever been printed on these
matters, and at the least, a reference to Professor Miner’s book would have
been appropriate. Additionally Dr. Noskowa writes about this material in her work published in 2005, so there are at least two sources that precede Mr. Markiewicz's paper, and should have been referred to.
writer agrees with the author’s statement that “Stalin took a great interest in
Orlemański and his activities in the United States within the Polish American
spheres” I believe that it is Stanislaus Orlemanski’s two decade long work in
the Polish-American community that brought him to the attention of the Soviet
authorities, and not solely “through his work as a parish priest and as a
leading figure in the Kościuszko League”.
Orlemanski took assertive positions in attempting to empower the
Polish-American community; these actions had a long history, much earlier than
the formation of the Kosciuszko League, and were both clerical and
political.Yet upon his return from
Moscow, he accepted the suspensa of
the clerical authorities (which originated from Washington and not Springfield)
and submitted to the humiliation of presenting a public apology which had been
written for him.
I have not
(yet) found records of his making public political statement after mid-July
1944, thus it would appear that his pro-Soviet position was less meaningful to
him than his priestly duties.It will
take deeper research to determine the accuracy of that statement, but at this
point it would behoove researchers to remove Reverend Stanislaus Orlemanski
from a purely pro-Soviet position and allow a fuller picture to be presented,
as I would have hoped that Mr. Markiewicz would have presented in his article.
Stanislaus Orlemanski used the
English form of both his Christian name and surname, particularly in English
language materials, and so I will refer to him in that fashion. It is not
apparent if this was a typo, but at certain points, Rev. Orlemanski’s name
appears with a diacritical over the n, while the Reverend never used that form
in any English language materials (vide p. 54).
first began researching Rev. Orlemanski as a result of my work on the
English-speaking witnesses to Katyn, and specifically the role of Father Marie
Leopold Braun, AA, who was pastor of St. Louis des Français in Moscow.This work has been conducted at the National
Archives at College Park, at the Manuscript Division of Columbia University,
the Augustinians General House Archives in Rome as well as their Provincial
House, at least five other archives in other countries and also include the
‘general suspects’ i.e. FRUC etc. When I first began researching this issue it
also related to the issue of the Military Ordinariate attached to the First
Polish Army (i.e. Armia Berlinga).
 In this case I will use the Polish
spelling, as does Professor Anna Cienciala, since Lange did renounce his US
citizenship and was a Polish Ambassador.
be precise – the description reads Abitutyenci
Gimn. Sem. Pols. z roku 1910 w Orchard Lake, Mich., Zjazd
Kolezenski odbedzie sie dnia 19go czerwca 1918 roku, referring to students not graduates nor priests.
Interestingly, although this author’s research has not concentrated on Lange,
various articles and reports have been reviewed.It is clear that Lange’s visit did not hold
as much attraction as the visit of Orlemanski, as neither TASS nor the English
language press seems to have accorded it a similar level of attention.
vide Miner, Steven M.Stalin’s Holy War. University of North
Carolina Press, 2003
In their spring issue (April, 2014), Polish American Studies,
which is issued by the Polish American Historical Association, published an
article by a doctoral candidate at the Jagellonian University, Paweł
Markiewicz, which is entitled
Previously Unknown Soviet Documents
and Polish Americans During World War II
A most striking title and since Reverend Orlemanski has been
a subtopic of my research (worked in archives in Washington, DC; Boston, MA and
Rome, IT) and its quasi-abstract reads most attractively (vide below), I raced
to read the material
This article presents two previously
unknown Soviet archival documents. The first deals with the visit of Fr.
Stanislaw Orlemanski, a pro-Soviet Polish-American Catholic priest to Moscow
and his meeting with Stalin. This article presents two previously unknown
Soviet archival documents. The first deals with the visit of Fr. Stanislaw
Orlemanski, a pro-Soviet Polish-American Catholic priest to Moscow and his meeting
If only the author had fulfilled his sales pitch, if only
this had been unknown material, there would not be a need to write this note.
There have been previous comments in this blog, on material
which has appeared under the imprimatur of a university, and which is available
on the internet and contains errors or misstatements of fact.In each case the institution has been
approached and asked to amend/ correct/ remove the material from their webpage.
In an age where materials appear throughout the world, it is imperative that
scholars be peer reviewed.It is for
that reason that this author is grateful for the criticism, advice, comments
and suggestions - primarily of Professor Anna Cienciala as well as Professor Wojciech
Materski, and to numerous others, some scholars, some not – many of whom have
simply asked a question be it about a document or about a conclusion… even in
writing a blog, one needs to be conscientiously precise.
In this case, the material appeared in print in a small press
run, however, the damage is that it has also appeared on a website called
academia.edu (join 12,000,000) and thus enters into ‘facto-mythology’ as real
history.Seemingly well written, with a
number of footnotes, of course referring to work by various members of PAHA, it
omits discussion of a major work, published in 2003, which completely counters
the title. In this case, as opposed to the Vanderbilt University case, I
publish the author’s name since he is a doctoral candidate and thus expected to
be “held to a higher standard”.
The premise of a scholarly publication is that it presents
research and allows for an open discussion between researchers and scholars. I
therefore approached the editor of Polish American Studies, Dr. James Pula and
submitted a letter to the editor in which misstatements were noted and corrections
including appropriate references were included.Dr. Pula responded that the “article” would not be published.This refusal means that an entire generation of readers who
find this material on the web will be misled.
In light of that it is necessary, as it has been earlier, to
publish a commentary on this article which is flawed and not properly
documented – specifically in one of its main assertions. The study of the
Stalinist period is complex enough, and when documentation appears, it must be
meticulous, not sloppy.Declarations of
fact must be precise and footnoted, not simply put in print.
The letter follows – and if there is documentation for the
main assertion – the author is asked - please present it!
that is not the language of the message – it is rather
Stewart’s approximation of his message. A slight but significant difference.
“These messages were
subsequently forwarded to Washington and provided first hand acknowledgement in
July 1943 that Western forensics believed the Soviet Union was guilty…”T
Neither Van Vliet nor Stewart were forensic specialists and
I have no idea where this idea is taken from. I would appreciate learning where
there is any documentation of either of them being a forensic specialist.
Further, the messages were not subsequently forwarded to
Washington – please read the AP story of September 10, 2012 where this is described
with some accuracy.The code users were
referred to as registered – because they were registered and all POW letters
went through a specific Post Office – so they went to MIS-X BEFORE they got to
Van Vliet’s coded letters have yet to be located in the NA
– but both Stewart and VV sent coded letters.In fact, as Big X in Oflag 64, it was Van Vliet who arranged for hand
guns to be shipped into the camp.
PLEASE – there were three John Van Vliet’s in the US Army
over the years – and this one was Jr.–
it is important to differentiate.
Problematically, these several pages omit the entire fact
that the two US Army officers were part of a group of eight men ordered taken
to Katyn, and that of the eight at least three others left reports or other
records behind confirming their opinion or where they were unable to do so, because
of British MI-9 pressure – of not accusing the Germans.They were not all officers, not even were
they all military.
“…the other American officer, a West Point graduate, who
was taken from his prisoner of war camp…” Both Van Vliet and Stewart were West
Point graduates, and both were POWs and both were held in the same camp.
“At the end of the
trip the Germans tried to get a statement ….. but all the men refused…” The
men had acknowledged the “terrible
implications” when they were brought to Berlin, prior to departure for
Katyn.That is why when each of them was
questioned PRIOR TO THE TRIP – each refused to aid and abet, that is why when
the Senior Officer was asked to sign a parole, he refused and that is why four
of the men in the original group of twelve were returned to their camps.None of this was secret as it is part of the
“Many of the men who
were brought with Van Vliet by the Germans were not medical personnel.”To be accurate – the sentence should read –“Insofar as we currently
know; only one of the eight men in the group brought to the massacre site was a
“However, a British medical captain was with the
Americans….and the Nazi methodology.” This sentence implies a predominance of
Americans in the group – yet the Americans were only two out of eight. What
Nazi methodology – the doctor never made a reference to Nazi methodology.
“None of this information was reported before the end of
the war….”Yes, this information was
reported prior to the end of the war – in November of 1944 and the report was
forwarded by the British to the State Dept.
Page 40 –
“Upon his release in
1945, Van Vliet filed a report …. with US Army Intelligence in Berlin.”
Van Vliet was never
in Berlin in 1945.Period. He did
not file a report in Berlin.In fact he
did not file a report in Europe.He
reported to certain individuals, in some cases in lesser in some cases in
greater detail – but there was no written report. To file a report is a clear indication of a
written document.He was questioned (as
I discovered in November 2013) under oath – and thus submitted a sworn
deposition.A highly significant
document, with many legal implications, however, not a report.
“…Van Vliet was
handed a gag order by Maj. Gen. Bissell….”By quoting, not from Van Vliet’s testimony there is a miscontrual – Van
Vliet testified clearly, that he was aware that people knew he had been in
Katyn, he and Stewart had managed, all the time were in the Oflag to avoid
discussing the matter.He wanted to have
formal protection to keep him from being questioned in a post-war world and he
requested an order binding him to secrecy.
“The Van Vliet
Report…. and subsequently was ‘deep sixed’ in the military intelligence
archives by Maj. Gen. Bissell…”The fact is that there is no proof that
Maj. General Bissell ever deep sixed the report.There is, in the newly declassified
information enough to counter that allegation that I would suggest that one
would want to refrain from making it as a blanket assertion.
“…FDR asked Earle to
use his contacts in the Balkans and Poland to try and discover who was really
responsible for the massacre.From the
Embassy Earle would send hundreds of pages of material from his sources…..”
This highly unusual statement intrigues me, as until now I
had never seen a statement that FDR has asked Earle to use his contacts in
Poland.Perhaps, I missed
something.Could I ask for a scan or a
direct link to a document that refers to this?Also although Earle sent a multitude of items, I never tallied it in the
hundreds of pages.Is there a specific
chart or table totaling these items?I
would be grateful if I could have access to that.
However, with respect to Earle’s expulsion to Samoa – he
also noted that when he was brought back, shortly after FDR’s demise – the
Naval Commanders’ (technically Earle served in the Navy) apologized to
him.If correct, this would imply a
split between the military and the administration on their view of the Soviet
“The success of the
Soviets made it very likely that the Red Army would liberate Poland and Eastern
Europe, thereby putting Roosevelt at a marked disadvantage.”This sentence avoids several facts – the
first that the Red Army victory was to be based on the materiel and supplies
received in the Lend Lease program and without with which Stalin had
nothing.Thus Roosevelt chose to use
American materiel and supplies as an offset for the sacrifice of various ethnic
groups which were ordered sent ahead of the Red Army to serve as cannon
fodder.It also avoids discussion of the
fact that when it was possible for the US Army to liberate all of Germany –
they were pulled back some 100 miles.The refusal to implement and attack through the Balkans can be similarly
viewed – FDR had made a decision to offer up Eastern and South Eastern Europe
to Stalin – as FDR told Archbishop Spellman well PRIOR to Teheran – “The European people will simply have to
endure the Soviet domination…”
Roosevelt chose to be at a disadvantage – he did not have
to be at one. (Apologies for my
digression into a commentary on theories.)
The remarks of the Polish government are presented without any indication that
the Poles did other than simply complain and demand during the war.There is no mention of the Polish Army under
British Command in any of its aspects or the Polish RAF Squadrons.
Footnote 134 – “…the
lands that were being so passionately demanding … had been taken from the
Soviet Union during a war with the Soviet Union…”
There is no mention of the fact that the Bolsheviks (not
yet the Soviet Union) had attacked Poland, no mention of the fact that these
lands had historically been Polish for hundreds of years, that culturally and
educationally they were linked with Poland over the generations.Stalin’s grievance was over the fact that due
to his error in judgment –what he saw as a sure victory was lost in that war.Not these lands – but all the lands of Poland
that he wanted to occupy.
Footnote 151 – Soviet Army on the banks of the Vistula –
members of the 1st Polish Army asked for permission to cross the river
and join and were denied.
Footnote 152 – Use of Soviet airbases during the Uprising –
the Soviets did not allow Americans to refuel on Soviet territory, thus many
missions ended with the pilots crashing.They were often aided by local Polish citizens who helped them make it out.Others were not so lucky.
Page 52 –
“Instead the London
government lost its only military power in Poland.”This statement equates the Home Army units in
Warsaw with the totality of the Home Army units in all of Poland. I would
suggest that this is an extreme statement and incorrect.
Appendix – what is referred to as booklet forwarded by
Earle – I would posit looks like the material published in Signal in a
multiplicity of languages and easily available to be verified.Not verifying the origins of this material is
disappointing ‘honors’ work.
This is continuing commentary on the errors in the
Vanderbilt University awarded History Honors Thesis
Page 24 –
scratched into the cars…”these were
not cars – these were railroad wagons, actually freight or cargo wagons, and this
was not a warning, they were a documentation listing the tally of individuals
removed.A similar tally was found in
Kozielsk by the officers who were brought in from Lithuania in June of 1940.
Page 26-27 and other pages –
which discuss the Soviet input into the war effort
– fail at any time to mention not only the Polish input into the Battle of
Britain, the land campaigns in North Africa and the ongoing input into of
Polish intelligence into the British and US intelligence pool.This was not simply an issue of the Poles
fighting in Poland. Certainly these points could be used to countermand the
statement on Soviet input.
Page 27 and ongoing-
The facts relating to the English-speaking
witnesses are something that I have been studying in detail since 2009 and
documented in printed form in the summer of 2012. Certainly, additional
facts have been made clearer - i.e. although by 2012 it was clear that that
both Van Vliet and Stewart were code users, I did not locate copies of
the coded letters concerning Katyn until August 2012; however, in
2012 I precisely describe the method in which coded letters functioned in
However, among the multiple errors made concerning
the witnesses I will only mention three at this time:
1- Both Lt. Col. John H. Van Vliet, Jr. and Captain
(NOT Major) Donald B. Stewart were registered code users. Thus any
assertion to the contrary is erroneous.
2- The description of secret reports – and the
discussion of his original position imply that Stewart and by inference, Van
Vliet, sent lengthy missives.Instead
these were simple aerograms – the standard approved for POWs aerogrammes which
were coopted to serve another purpose.They were no more than 1.5 pages long.The author is comingling the letters with the 1950 re-created Van Vliet
report and the testimony of both men to the Madden Committee.
3- The coded letters were sent in June and July
1943 and again in the spring of 1944 (the latter was in response to the
Burdenko report). They simply confirmed Soviet guilt they were no more
expansive than that
4- There is no documentation that G-2 ever passed
the reports on to the administration. (Which does not mean that I do not
believe it was – but there is no ground for such a statement.)
Again this is not a report – it is a letter.
I would posit that the Catholic population in the
US was not only concerned about the treatment of Poles in the USSR but of all
Catholics in that nation.(One may need
to differentiate between the hierarchy and lay Catholics, and also try to
understand the position of Eastern Rite Catholics.)
Page 33 –
was not only head of the Polish National Alliance – he was received by
Roosevelt as head of the Polish American Congress which had been created in May
of 1944.The Polish National Alliance
(PNA or ZNP) was a fraternal organization primarily serving the life insurance
needs of its members. Clearly, there were other similar organizations – thus
his role as the head of the PNA was not of overriding importance.Rather the larger Polish American Congress
(Kongres Polonii Amerykańskiej) was of greater importance.
Page 36 -
Footnote 98 – The Madden Committee existed for not more
than 14 months – not several years.
Page 37 –
OWI – it would have been appropriate to note that the then
head of OWI was future Senator Cranston.
Certainly not the only matter which was not disclosed to
the Madden Committee – the coded letters were not discussed there, nor was the
British Memo of June 1943, sent to MIS-X and others, which confirmed that there
were British and US officers taken to Katyn.Information had been sent from the Oflag in May of 1943 – before the
group even got to Katyn.
Page 38 –
Again, not a report
– but rather coded letters sent by both Lt. Col. John H. Van Vliet, Jr. and
Captain Donald B. Stewart.
status of Maj. (sic) Stewart was classified…”The status of Captain Stewart was never
classified and he was the first witness to testify before the Madden
Committee.This assertion is patently
Further, neither Stewart nor Van Vliet ever testified
before the Madden Committee about being code users, neither was it mentioned in
any of the audio or video material is that they made.It was however, mentioned in Van Vliet’s
final Oral History interview in 1995.All soldiers who were code users were required to sign an oath upon
returning to the US that they would never disclose the code use.This requirement continued through Vietnam
and even into Desert Storm. (I have not had occasion to interview veterans of